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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYMPOSIUM
Investor-State Arbitration 
as Part of the International 
Rule of Law
Investor-state arbitration is not only the most heated topic 
discussed in international economic law, but it also has 
become an important political issue more generally. Indeed, 
it is amazing to see how a topic that, some years ago, 
interested only a handful of international economic lawyers 
and very few academics has emerged today as an issue on 
which everybody has an opinion. Moreover, there seems to 
be only one direction that all participants of the debate 
follow: investor-state arbitration or, as it is usually called, 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is an evil, is in 
violation of principles of constitutional law and democracy, is 
an instrument exclusively for profit-seeking companies and 

lawyers without social commitments, is “private” in nature as 
opposed to public court proceedings, and, because of all this, 
needs to be abolished as soon as possible.
Much has already been written and said about ISDS and 
investment protection, unfortunately not always on a very 
objective basis. This is not the place to reconstruct the entire 
debate. Instead, only a very limited number of arguments 
shall be presented in order to explain the rationale and 
legitimacy of investment protection and ISDS in a broader 
constitutional and public international law context.
The overall rationale of international investment agreements 
(IIAs) is well known: the legal and economic relationship 
between the foreign investor and the host state of the 
investment is usually not protected by public international 
law. Thus, in many cases, there are no restrictions on the 
host state to change its domestic laws to the detriment of the 
foreign investor. Moreover, due to the lack of international 
rules, the home state of the investor usually has no or very 
limited avenues for diplomatic protection (for a classical 
example, see the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case). This 
corresponds to a situation in constitutional law visible in 
many jurisdictions: reflecting public international law, 
domestic constitutions often fall short of extending 
constitutional rights to foreign investors. They differentiate 
between the protection of citizens and foreigners. This is 
even more frequently true with regard to judicial/legal 
persons. If legal persons are granted constitutional rights, the 
rights are usually restricted to domestic legal persons. Art. 19
(3) of the German Constitution is a good example in this 
regard. It reads as follows: “The basic rights shall also apply 
to domestic artificial persons to the extent that the nature of 
such rights permits.” Moreover, the legal person is usually 
not subject to any international human rights protection. 
With the notable exception of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, international human rights instruments do 
not apply to legal persons. As the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission in a report from 1999 stated: “[t]he 
Convention grants its protection to physical or natural 
persons. However, it excludes from its scope legal or artificial 
persons, since they represent a legal fiction.” (Report Nº 
106/99, para. 17).
It is thus obvious that there is a gap in international and 
domestic constitutional law with respect to the legal 
protection of foreign investors in comparison to domestic 
investors. Granting investment protection by IIA is thus not 
per se providing “better rights” to foreign investors, but first 
of all only filling a legal gap in international and domestic 
constitutional law, i.e., leveling the playing field between 
foreign and domestic investors. By the same token, this gap is 
the rationale for investment arbitration.
Investment arbitration is usually not an “alternative” dispute 
resolution mechanism, but the only enforceable legal means 
for the foreign investor to protect his or her investment. 
International law is, in many cases, not applicable in 
domestic courts. This might be the result of the lex posterior 
rule as to “later” domestic law affecting foreign investors’ 
interests, or of a general exclusion of the applicability of 
international law. A good example in this regard is the regular 
practice of the European Union (EU) regarding the 
conclusion of free-trade agreements (FTAs). All FTAs with or 
without investment chapters the EU has concluded during 
the last 10 years or so and also the currently discussed drafts 
of CETA, EU-Vietnam etc. contain an explicit provision 
specifying that the respective agreement is not directly 
applicable before domestic courts (for details see Semertzi, 
CMLR 2014, pp. 1125–1158).
Moreover, there is no monopoly of the state to organize 
dispute settlement procedures in domestic courts. To the 
contrary, as the ECtHR just recently underlined again, 
arbitration is an exercise of individual freedom as a human 
right (see ECtHR, Tabbane v. Switzerland (application no. 
41069/12), Judgment of 24 March 2016). This applies equally 
to commercial arbitration and ISDS. The involvement of the 
state as a party to arbitration and thus of public interests as 
the subject of the arbitral proceeding, does not change this, 
as demonstrated by the recognition of arbitration as a means 
of dispute settlement in domestic administrative law and by 
the many cases in which the state is suing private economic 
entities before domestic or international arbitral tribunals 
(for examples see here and here).
One of the biggest myths in this regard is the idea that 
investment arbitration is conducted by “private” tribunals. 
Investment arbitration is usually based on an arbitration 
clause which is part of an investment treaty between two or 
more states. Investment arbitration is therefore per 
definitionem public arbitration or at least some kind of sui 
generis arbitration (for details see here). With respect to 
public interests in this kind of arbitration, it is not arbitration 
that is the problem; problems that might occur in this 
context are an issue of substantive, applicable law. It is the 
respective applicable law that needs to reflect public 
interests.
Even though the general idea of not only commercial, but 
also investment arbitration is the exercise of party autonomy 
in areas in which there is no monopoly of domestic courts, 
specific rules are necessary to reflect the importance of 
public interests at stake. Most important in this regard is 
transparency. To this end, the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration of 1 
April 2014 and the United Nations Convention on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration are 
important reform developments, even though the 
Convention on Transparency has so far only been ratified by 
one state (Mauritius).
Next to transparency, an essential element of the legitimacy 
of arbitration is the insurance of equal rights for both 
disputing parties. The possibility for both parties to 
autonomously appoint an arbitrator is an important aspect of 
this. This also applies to a court system of arbitration. 
German Courts currently question the legality and legitimacy 
of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (Lausanne) because 
athletes have less influence on appointing potential 
arbitrators than sports associations (see the decision of the 
OLG Munich in the Pechstein case). If one applies this 
rationale to the Court system of investment arbitration as 
proposed by the EU and already implemented in the FTAs of 
the EU with Canada and Vietnam, it is obvious that respective 
arbitral awards under the new system will face legal 
challenges.
In sum, any discussion on ISDS must be framed within the 
broader picture of international investment protection in 
general. Even though investment arbitration as we know it 
today is comprehensively accessible to the public (see here 
for a comprehensive database) and subject to very strict 
scrutiny regarding the independence of the arbitrators, there 
is no doubt that the system – just as any legal system – is in 
periodical need of reform. The EU has recently tabled 
convincing reform proposals, namely with regard to 
substantive investment protection, even though the 
proposed investment court system, which remains a system 
of arbitration, raises legal questions. While discussing these 
and other reform proposals, one should not forget that 
arbitration is essentially, and must remain, an exercise of 
individual freedom and be based on an equal footing of the 
parties involved.
A response to this post can be found here.
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